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To ascertain the prevalence of soft budgets and to find causes of softness, we surveyed Mongolian enterprises, asking whether state aid was expected when financial difficulties arose. One-quarter of enterprises expected soft-budgets, a large proportion of which have central government ownership. We examine causes of soft budgets in addition to state ownership, but the central government variable dominates. These results are confirmed when using instrumental variables or bivariate probit to unmask unmeasured selection effects. Local government ownership has a much weaker effect than does central ownership, suggesting the crucial role of decentralization.
I. Introduction
There is universal agreement that the hardening of budget constraints is necessary for spurring enterprise adjustment in transition countries (World Bank, 1996, p. 45) . There is also widespread evidence that budget constraints have hardened considerably in the 1990's (Pinto et al 1993 , Kornai 1993 , and Schaffer 1998 . But there is much less consensus on which factors have been responsible for reducing the prevalence of soft budgets. This lack of consensus is reflected in the publication in recent years of a number of theoretical articles laying out a variety of mechanisms that produce soft budgets.
1 Thus, for policy-makers and for those interested in testing hypotheses generated by theory, it is a matter of vital concern to identify those circumstances that in practice lead to soft-budget regimes.
Despite considerable progress, soft budgets are still quite common in transition countries (Belka et al 1994; Alfandari, Fan, and Freinkman, 1996; Earle, Estrin, and Leshchenko 1996 , Li and Liang 1998 , and Schaffer 1998 . Therefore, events in those countries provide considerable scope for examining the determinants of soft budgets, much more so than in stable capitalist economies. However, because of the limited duration of the transition process and because of the difficulty of obtaining data, empirical research on this question has been limited to date (Li and Liang, 1998, p.106) .
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A foremost difficulty in undertaking empirical research on soft budgets is in operationalizing the notion of softness itself. Kornai's (1980) classic definition focuses on expectations of the state's willingness to help enterprises escape the consequences of financial setbacks: "the expectation of the decision-maker as to whether the firm will receive help in time of trouble or not is an essential component..." (Kornai, 1998, pp. 14-15) . This definition suggests that operationalization must reflect two principal factors. First, soft-budgets are an expectational phenomenon: they cannot be measured by -2-3. Moreover, as Kornai (1992a p. 10) argues, subsidies are also given to enterprises for reasons unrelated to soft budgets. 4 . The survey covered all privatized enterprises in the national capital, Ulaanbaatar, plus those in the regional centers of eight of the remaining twenty-one administrative districts of the country. The survey collected both qualitative information, from general directors using a survey containing close-ended questions, and quantitative accounting information. The response rate for the survey was above 99%. The relatively more cumbersome logistical requirements for collecting detailed accounting information led to a research design with a 10% smaller sample of enterprises for the collection of accounting information than for the qualitative information.
focusing solely on current policy actions, such as subsidies. Imprudent behavior due to the expectation of a soft budget can occur in enterprises not currently receiving subsidies.
3 Second, the expectations concern what will happen when times are difficult for the enterprise. Indeed, it is this second aspect that makes analysis of soft budgets so important because it is responsible for the prominent position given to the hardening of budget constraints in policy debates (Schaffer 1998, p. 84) , reflecting the dangers of moral hazard engendered by making state aid conditional on poor performance.
With these concerns in mind, the present paper uses survey data that elicits the expectations of managers. This approach is in contrast to the existing literature, which measures soft budgets by focusing on current policy actions, particularly on explicit and implicit subsidies. Our expectational approach has the advantage that it hones in directly on whether enterprises foresee help in times of trouble, rather than focusing on a less direct measure, current aid. It also avoids the inevitably imperfect cataloging of all the sources of state aid, which can be legion and difficult to uncover in the murk of the transition-country policy environment (Schaffer, 1998) . Of course asking enterprise officials directly about soft budgets has its disadvantages too, particularly those associated with the validity of survey evidence concerning expectations rather than facts. Nevertheless, given the paucity of empirical information available concerning the causes of soft budgets, survey evidence of a new kind carries the potential of offering significant new insights.
To collect the evidence used in this study, in mid-1996 we surveyed over half of the enterprises that had passed through Mongolia's mass privatization program for large enterprises. Table 1 , which summarizes enterprise responses. In framing the question, two pragmatic concerns dictated elements of the phrasing. First, to remove any negative connotations that respondents might feel in acknowledging the possibility of state handouts, the question focuses on employment as the goal of soft budgets. Employment maintenance is an objective of governments in transition countries and it is a goal that would be seen as positive by an overwhelming majority of Mongolians. Second, to remove any ethical content from the responses, the question used "unfortunate market conditions" as the cause of the enterprise's problems, rather than any wording that could have been taken to imply that the enterprise was responsible for its own plight. We assumed that we would not obtain accurate answers if the question suggested that managers would profit from the state handouts or if it implicitly blamed managers for the enterprise's problems. show that the degree of softness varies with little else. Thus, the pivotal results of the paper are already -4-6. This section provides only the information necessary for an understanding of the general context in which the paper's results should be placed. For further detail, see Boone (1994) on stabilization, Murrell, Dunn, and Korsun (1996) on price liberalization, and Korsun and Murrell (1995) on privatization. captured in Table 1 : state ownership and centralization are overwhelmingly important in determining expectations of soft budgets.
Of course, Table 1 is no more than suggestive. It tells us nothing about levels of statistical significance or of the effects of omitted variables on the strength of ownership effects. Moreover, the patterns in that Table could simply reflect the selection of enterprises into state ownership, where the characteristics of enterprises with residual state ownership are exactly those characteristics that lead to soft budgets, independently of ownership. However, when we address these issues in the remaining sections of this paper, the message from the Table is resoundingly endorsed.
The analysis begins in Section II, which provides the background on Mongolia necessary to interpret the results and to suggest variables that should be included in the analysis. Section III examines possible determinants of soft budgets using ordered-probit single-equation methods, introducing the omitted variables suggested by existing theories as well as by the features of Mongolia. Section IV examines the vexing issue of selection: are soft budgets produced by unobserved characteristics of state enterprises that are related to state ownership, rather than state ownership per se? Two different approaches are taken to investigate selection effects, based on different approaches to simplifying the econometric structure of the problem. The effect of central government ownership appears to be stronger once selection effects are taken into account. A concluding section draws together this paper's lessons.
II. Background: Mongolian Reforms and Government

6
In 1990, Mongolia's peaceful revolution led to sweeping reforms. The movement to democracy was swift and apparently irreversible. After an election in mid-1990, a broad coalition government was formed in which the old communist party, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), was dominant.
-5-However, the economics portfolio was held by one of the new parties, which had been formed by a group of young economists who were convinced that the country needed radical reforms. The first two years of democracy saw very strong economic reform.
An election in 1992 gave the MPRP an overwhelming majority in parliament. The new parties left the coalition and the MPRP governed alone for four years. During this time, economic reforms proceeded less swiftly, but the general direction of reform was clear. So, too, was the cementing of democratic reforms, which was underscored by the election of a non-MPRP president in 1993 and the surprise election victory in 1996 of the Democratic Union, a coalition of new parties.
The data presented in this paper reflect the circumstances immediately before the 1996 election. This was the end of a period (1992-6) in which the government had been more conservative than its predecessor, which had instituted the mass privatization program during 1990-2. These temporal changes in the reform orientation of government are exactly those most suited to examining the effects of privatization. In currently popular views, a reformist government undertakes privatization in order to change the incentives of subsequent governments, which might be more favorable to intervention. The context of our data set, a conservative government inheriting an economy with a large stock of recently privatized enterprises, affords a prime opportunity to observe whether private ownership provides the hypothesized binding effect.
Mongolian economic reforms during 1991-1996 exhibited the ebbs and flows so typical of reforming countries. Formal liberalization of the economy was announced very early, but actual liberalization proceeded more slowly, with many lingering interventions. By the end of 1993, despite the failure of initial attempts at stabilization, runaway inflation no longer appeared to be a danger. Nevertheless, since that time successive governments have struggled to maintain fiscal balance and monetary control, inflation remaining above 50% in 1995 and 1996. Growth resumed in mid-1993, after a relatively mild (for transition countries) fall in GDP of 20%. Concurrent with the fall in GDP, there was a catastrophic drop -6-in living standards as a result of the withdrawal of Soviet aid, which during the 1980's had been as high as 30% of Mongolian GDP.
The centerpiece of the early economic reforms was privatization, which consisted of three different programs, for small, large, and agricultural enterprises. Our data reflect the circumstances of the enterprises that passed through the large privatization program, which began in March 1992 and ended in mid-1995. In the next four years, 483 large enterprises were privatized in the voucher, mass-privatization program: 55% in 1992, 30% in 1993, 12% in 1994, and 3% in 1995 . The characteristics of these enterprises are such that they would have always been privately owned had they been in a developed market economy, since they are in manufacturing, distribution, and service sectors in which competition is eminently feasible. They are not in activities in which special regulatory regimes usually apply: airlines, railroads, telecommunications, and utilities are not among them.
Enterprises had little scope for decision-making during privatization. All large enterprises went through the same privatization process: preparation of a plan, including the determination of the residual state share, corporatization, and finally the sale of shares, for the vouchers that had been issued to every citizen. Markets, in which vouchers were exchanged for shares, determined the allocation of enterprise shares among individuals. In the sample of enterprises studied in this paper, the state ownership share averages 20.4%, while insiders and their families own 35% and outsiders 45%. Of the 249 enterprises in our sample, 109 had lingering state ownership. Although the size of state ownership varies across the spectrum, by far the most common value is 51% of shares. In nearly two-thirds of the enterprises with residual state ownership, the state share is 51%.
In Mongolia, as in many other transition countries, insider owners find it easier to gain representation on corporate bodies than do non-state outsiders. On the one hand, insider shareholding probably resulted from concerted efforts on the part of employees to hold a large share in their own enterprises. On the other, outsiders had few mechanisms to create blocks of shares. Investment funds are not of any significance.
-7-7. On the subject matter of the ensuing paragraphs, see Enkhbat (1993) , Government of Mongolia (1993) , Government of Mongolia (1995) , and State Statistical Office of Mongolia (1996) .
Vouchers were non-tradeable, so that initial share ownership was diffuse. The secondary trading of shares officially began in August 1995, only ten months before our data was collected. As a result, by mid-1996, only thirteen percent of enterprises reported any presence on their boards of individuals representing investment funds or large outsider shareholders.
Since an important element of this paper's results lies in differentiating between the actions of central and local government, some brief comments on the structure of government are appropriate. Mongolia is a unitary state. The formal authority of local governments is heavily circumscribed by the central government, echoing the country's origins in a highly centralized communist state. However, localities have more discretion than suggested by the centralized state structure as a result of the decreased willingness and the declining capacity of the central government to exercise the control that it formally possesses. With the formal rules incompletely specified, sometimes contradictory, and undergoing rapid change, the degree of discretion held and exercised by any particular local government can be quite high. In sum, local governments face hard -8-8. The terms are introduced for parsimony only and do not reflect de jure ownership rights, which have remained ill-defined throughout the reform era. Retained enterprise shares are simply classified as state-owned without any formal designation of which state agency is the legal owner. The terms centrally owned and locally owned do reflect de facto usage rights, which have become cemented through time in informal arrangements. budget constraints, but have a considerable degree of flexibility, within those budgets, to conduct policy. In particular, if local governors decide that aid to enterprises is advisable, they have the flexibility and the resources to provide such aid.
These background notes end with terminology. We use the term "centrally owned enterprise" to designate an enterprise that has residual state ownership that is administered by the central government.
The designation "locally owned" is analogously defined, as are the terms central and local ownership.
Note, however, that the difference between these two types of enterprises does not lie in ownership per se, but rather in which level of government administers ownership.
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III. Searching for Omitted Variables
In this section, we examine the effect on soft budgets of variables that are suggested by existing theory and by peculiar features of Mongolia. In particular, we focus on whether the relationships evident in Table   1 still hold once such variables are introduced into the analysis.
There is an extensive theoretical literature on why state ownership might lead to soft budgets. Kornai (1980) provides the seminal analysis suggesting that state paternalism provides the causal link. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) show that the political objective of maintaining employment is fostered by state ownership when the political cost of subsidizing employment through direct grants is higher than the cost of forgoing the state's share of enterprise profits. Moreover, theories proposing centralization as a cause of soft budgets (Dewatripoint and Maskin, 1995) indirectly suggest a focus on state ownership, since privatization is one mechanism of decentralizing relationships.
These theories, as well as much historical experience, provide compelling reasons to include state ownership as the pivotal variable in our empirical analysis.
-9-9. See Dewatripoint and Maskin (1995) , who focus on the decentralization of credit markets. If decentralization of state ownership leads to a wider variety of sources of credit, as is likely, then their results are applicable. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) predict that the degree of soft budgets varies with the amount of state ownership, providing a justification for the use of a continuous state ownership variable. Of course, there could well be some non-linearity in the relationship between ownership and softness, the first percentage owned presumably being less important than the fifty-first. However, in our empirical analyses, we use solely the linear state ownership variable for a variety of reasons. First, the ordered probit technique used in this section implicitly allows non-linearity. Second, there are no parameters in Mongolian corporate law suggesting where non-linearities might occur. Third, robustness checks using a variety of dummy variables for different levels of ownership evidenced no variation in the qualitative character of the results.
Presumably, one reason for this robustness is that nearly two-thirds of state-owned enterprises have 51% ownership, implying that the continuous variable is highly correlated with a majority-ownership dummy.
III.1 Local and Central Ownership
There are several theoretical contributions that suggest a relationship between soft budgets and the level of government that holds ownership. Oates and Schwab (1988) show that inter-jurisdictional competition between local governments will weed out inefficient policies. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that the connection between state ownership and soft budgets is weaker when the government's own fiscal constraint is tighter, implying that local governments will usually impose harder budget constraints. In China, this has certainly been the case (Qian and Xu, 1993) . Qian and Roland (1996b) establish a direct link between governmental decentralization and harder budget constraints by showing that inter-regional competition for capital raises the cost of subsidies and reduces the incentive for bailouts. Somewhat more indirectly, the theories focusing on the effects of decentralization are relevant, suggesting fewer soft budgets under a decentralized regime.
9
-10-In Mongolia, local governments have hard budget constraints but also the flexibility to aid enterprises within these constraints. In addition, the local governments face inter-jurisdictional competition, as regional shares of national markets shift and as new enterprises choose between localities. The central government possesses the tools of a sovereign state, but nevertheless is constrained by the agreements with international financial institutions that are so advisable for a small country sandwiched between two great powers. Hence, one would predict that local government ownership would be less important a determinant of soft budgets than would central government ownership, reflecting the higher opportunity cost of inefficient policies at the local than at the national level.
We therefore use two separate state ownership variables in our analysis: Ceno i is percentage central government ownership of enterprise i and Loco i is percentage local government ownership. Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics appear in Table 2 .
Given the nature of the question reported in Table 1 , ordered probit is the natural tool to relate softbudget scores to their determinants. Suppose that Y i * is a continuous latent variable reflecting the degree of softness of the budget constraint of enterprise i. Then:
where X i is a vector of observations on other pertinent enterprise characteristics, $, (, and * are parameters, and , i is an error term. Then, if Soft i is the response of enterprise i on the soft budget survey question (Soft i = 0, 1,...,10), Soft i is related to Y i * in the following manner:
# " j , then Soft i = j ; for j = 1,...,9; and if " 9 < Y i * , then Soft i = 10, with " 0 <...<" 9 parameters.
-11-10. These intercept coefficients are always significant at conventional levels of significance.
We estimate the parameters " 0 ,...," 9 , $, (, and * by ordered probit. The working assumption at this stage is that all non-state-ownership determinants of soft budgets are included in the vector X i so that Ceno i
and Loco i are both uncorrelated with , i . In Section IV, we examine this assumption.
The results appear Table 3 , whose first column contains the ordered probit regression when only state ownership variables are included. The size of ( and * relative to the " j gives important information on the strength of the ownership effect. To ease the reader's task and to reduce the size of the Table, we provide this information in summary form, omitting estimates of the ten " j . 10 We use the values of * and the " j to calculate Cen50, which shows the increase in percentage central ownership that would change the degree of softness of the budget constraint by 50%, from a value of Soft that is on the borderline between 0 and 1 to a value that is on the borderline between a score of five and six. Loc50 is analogously defined for the local ownership variable.
This first regression solidifies the impressions from Table 1 . Central ownership is highly significant and local ownership is weakly significant. A change of central ownership of 52% would lead to a "50% softening" of the budget constraint, while even complete local ownership would not lead to this degree of softness.
In the ensuing sub-sections, we examine the effects of other variables that are suggested by existing
theories. Each variable is tested in two versions of the ordered probit. First, we run regressions that contain the state ownership variables and one other variable (columns 2-10 of Table 3 ). Then, we present a regression containing all variables (column 11.) The two versions of the ordered probit regressions are consistent in their qualitative implications.
III.2 Insiders and
Outsiders.
-12-11. In concluding that the form of non-state ownership does not seem to affect the presence of soft budgets in Mongolia, our results differ slightly from those of Earle, Estrin, and Leshchenko (1996, p. 232) , who find that assistance from the state is less in employee-owned firms than in outsider-owned firms. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) argue that soft budgets are more likely to arise when the objectives of owners are similar to those of the government: insider ownership is more likely to lead to soft budgets than is outsider ownership. Earle and Estrin (1996, pp. 208-9 ) also emphasize the greater likelihood of soft budgets with insider ownership. Li (1996) theorizes that soft budget constraints arise when insiders have greater control rights than those formally bestowed by ownership. To examine these theories, we use the variable Inso, the percentage of the firm owned by insiders.
Given the identity relationship among the various forms of ownership (Ceno + Loco + Inso = 100 -outsider ownership) and the fact that outsider ownership is the omitted ownership variable, the coefficient on an included ownership variable measures the effect of increasing the value of the included variable while decreasing outsider ownership. The results in column 3 suggest that an exchange of ownership between insiders and outsiders makes little difference to soft budgets, while an exchange between the private sector and central government has a large effect.
Because it is difficult for outsider owners in Mongolia to effect concerted action, many outsider owners are passive. This suggests focusing on those outsiders who have been able to find a place in governance structures. The survey collected data on which enterprise boards included any individuals who represented either investment funds or large outsider shareholders. These data are the best available on whether outsiders have some potential to affect corporate activities. The dummy variable Outbrd reflects these data. The inclusion of this variable does not suggest revising any previous observations.
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III.3 Soft-budgets as Redistribution
-13-In Kornai's original formulation, soft budgets are seen primarily as a means of allowing enterprises to escape adjustments that would otherwise result from financial exigencies. This is the view that stimulated the wording in the question used to generate Soft. Given this wording there is no essential reason why Soft should reflect the present financial circumstances of the enterprise.
Nevertheless, memories can be short and an enterprise that is currently in difficult circumstances might have a clearer memory of soft budgets. In order to examine whether this is the case, we included current profits (Prof) in the regression. However, profits might be an unsatisfactory measure because potential profits might well be paid as excess wages in insider controlled firms. This suggests using value-added per employee (Vapl). The inclusion of these variables (columns 4,5, and 11) does not add any information.
Less profitable or less productive enterprises do not seem to perceive soft budgets any more strongly than do other enterprises.
III.4 Too Big to Fail
Kornai (1992b, p. 143) suggests that larger enterprises have softer budgets and Alfandari, Fan, and Freinkman (1996, p. 192) find that employment size is a determinant of enterprise subsidies in Russia.
Given the difficulties of collective action across enterprises and the relative ease of mobilizing a large number of workers in a single enterprise, large enterprises will usually have political power disproportionate to their size. Shleifer and Vishny's (1994) model predicts that enterprises with greater political power obtain more subsidies. These observations suggest using the number of employees as an explanatory variable (Emp). Moreover, an enterprise of a given size probably has more power the smaller is the jurisdiction in which it is situated, given the transactions costs of negotiating political deals and the leverage that results from first-past-the-post election rules. Hence, we also examine enterprise employment -14-12. Of course, if the level of employment is an effect rather than a cause of soft budgets, the regression will be mis-specified. Note, however, that the employment variable is lagged relative to the soft budget variable (and experiments with further lagging give the same results.) Moreover, it is likely that the coefficient on the employment variables will be biased upwards if there is a problem of endogeneity, suggesting that our conclusion does not suffer from biases due to endogeneity. as a share of the local population (Empsh). The inclusion of these variables causes no modification in previous conclusions (columns 6, 7, and 11).
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The relative importance of the enterprise on the national market might also be pertinent. In a small country such as Mongolia, which is relatively isolated from world markets by geography and by legacies of the communist era, an enterprise that is dominant in its market might well have the political muscle that comes from the ability to threaten disruptions in supply. Many large enterprises are important users of agricultural materials, the production of which supports a large share of the population. These enterprises have certainly been willing to exploit their links to the countryside for political advantage during the reform process.
Independent data on market concentration are not available and we are forced to use survey data. We asked enterprises to estimate their percentage share of the national market. However, there are obvious problems of endogeneity with this variable. State aid might enable an enterprise to gain a larger market share leading to a positive correlation between market share and soft budgets that has little to do with the causes of soft budgets.
To counter this problem, we used the survey data to construct a measure of market share that is exogenous to the enterprise. We assigned a 2-digit classification to each enterprise's major product. Then, for each enterprise in succession, we dropped that enterprise from the data set and ran an ordinary least squares regression of reported market shares on product and regional dummies. Predicted values from this regression were used as a proxies for market share. By construction, this variable, Mktshp, contains no direct information from the enterprise's report of its own market share.
-15-13. The seven sectors are heavy industry, light industry, agricultural processing, construction, transportation, distribution, and services.
This market share variable is highly significant (column 8), its presence strengthening the perceived effect of the state ownership variables. This variable measures market power on a national scale, something which is presumably much more important for the central government than for local government.
Hence, this variable is likely to reflect central government policy rather than local policies, which is consistent with previous observations on the relative importance of central and local ownership. These results suggest that political power arises more from market muscle than from enterprise size per se.
III.5 Sectoral and Regional Effects
Kornai (1992b, p. 143) suggests that priority sectors had soft budgets during the socialist era.
Certainly, in Mongolia the processing of agricultural raw materials has particular cachet. Therefore, we examine sectoral effects, for which we use a standard Mongolian seven-sector categorization.
13 For brevity, we do not report complete results: Table 3 reports the results only for the one sector dummy having a significant coefficient. This sector, the distribution or trade sector (Trade), has a significantly lower propensity to have soft budgets than other sectors when it is added on its own to the regression (column 9)
but not when included with all other variables (column 11.) The weakness of sectoral effects is not surprising. All the privatized enterprises are in activities that are normally in the domain of competitive markets. There are no utilities or national transport companies or telecommunications firms, or any other firms that are often subject to special regulatory activity in market economies. Price controls are no longer relevant for these enterprises.
In a country where democracy is so new and many old officials are still in power, it is plausible that there could be great differences between policies in different localities. Therefore, we constructed regional ownership variables analogous to Loco, measuring the ownership that is under the control of each of the nine local authorities covered by our sample. Again, complete results are not reported, since only one -16-14. Regional dummies were also examined, in addition to the ones mentioned in the text, which are regional dummies interacted with local ownership. None of the regional dummies were significant, suggesting that the ownership component of Regd is crucial.
regional ownership variable has a significant coefficient. This variable, Regd, is included in regressions 10 and 11, where the variable Loco becomes insignificant, suggesting that the significance of the local variable in the earlier regressions reflects the policies of just one region.
14 This region, Darhan, an industrial city, overspent its planned budget in 1995 by 54%, much more than did any other locality (State Statistical
Office of Mongolia, 1996, pp. 1-3.) Evidently, the locality itself had a soft budget, provided by the center.
We also calculate the value of Reg50, a variable analogous to Cen50 that measures the effects of an increase in ownership in Darhan. The values of Reg50 and Cen50 are similar in magnitude, indicating that local ownership in this city has an effect that is similar to that of central ownership, in contrast to the smaller effect of ownership in other localities.
III.6 A Summary
In regression 12, we include all the variables in regressions 1-11 that had significant t-statistics in at least one equation. The sectoral dummy in this regression is no longer significant (as is also the case in regression 11) and is omitted in column 13, which reports the regression that summarizes the results of this search for omitted variables. This summary regression suggests that state ownership, and little else, determines an enterprise's perceptions of whether it has a soft budget. The result for central ownership is robust across all the elements of Table 3 . However, the local ownership variable is of marginal significance in the summary regression and is not significant in several other instances. The magnitude of the local ownership effect is half that of central ownership.
IV. Seeking Selection Effects.
So far, we have treated , i and the included ownership variables as uncorrelated. This is reasonable under the assumption that we have been able to include all pertinent variables in X i . However, although the -17-15. When examining the determinants of government assistance to enterprises in Russia, Earle, Estrin, and Leshchenko (1996, pp. 226-233) show that the effects of ownership weaken considerably when selection effects are taken into account. Their approach to the selection issue uses lagged dependent variables. previous section covers the most plausible hypotheses suggesting elements of X i , one cannot be certain on an a priori basis that this assumption is correct. If there is an unmeasured determinant of Soft of which we are unaware, then the same variable might also be a determinant of Ceno, possibly leading to biases in the estimates presented in Table 3 .
More formally, our system of equations now comprises (1), (2), and:
where F(.) is a function that leads to censoring at 0, Z i is a vector of explanatory variables, and 0 i is an error term. (We focus solely on central ownership to simplify the presentation.) If all pertinent variables are included in X i in equation (1) and Z i in equation (3), then , i is independent of 0 i and the estimates in the preceding section are consistent. However, if there is a variable that belongs in both X i and Z i , but is unmeasured and omitted, then it is a component of both , i and 0 i . Then, Ceno i and , i are correlated and our previous estimates are inconsistent. (The same logic applies also to Loco and Regd.)
Combining an 11-category ordered probit with tobit formulations for each of the three state ownership variables presents a formidable challenge for estimation, one which has not been taken up in the existing literature and one which we do not pursue. Rather, a pragmatic route is taken, in which we employ two different methods of accounting for selection bias, based on two different sets of simplifying assumptions.
In section IV.1, we ignore the censoring of the ownership variables and the categorical character of Soft and use standard linear instrumental variable methods. In section IV.2, we use transformations of the pertinent variables in a bivariate probit model. The focus throughout is on examining whether the strong effect of central ownership survives when one allows for the possibility of selection effects.
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IV.1 Testing for Selectivity using Linear Instrumental Variables
-18-16. Indeed, many important participants were not aware of the overall dimensions of residual state share.
17. For the first 30 privatized enterprises in our sample, the state share averaged 18%, for the 91st to 120th, it averaged 8%, and for the 191st to the 220th, the average was 27%.
If one ignores the categorical and censored nature of Soft, then one can estimate the following linear equation using instrumental variables methods:
Ideally, the pertinent instruments would emerge through a precise understanding of the process that determined the size of residual state shares during privatization. Unfortunately, this process was not transparent. Decisions on the state share resulted from the interactions of many actors and extensive interviews with the major participants have not served to untangle the objectives and constraints that drove this process. 16 However, these interviews and a previous statistical study (Korsun and Murrell, 1998) have identified some of the variables that are pertinent: Appdate, the date at which the enterprise's privatization plan was approved, Share, the number of shares in the enterprise at the time of privatization, and Empp, employment at the time of privatization.
Each of these variables has a plausible relation to the size of state ownership. Appdate captures secular changes in residual state shares. After the first privatizations, the residual state share in successive privatizations tended to decline as the reforming government became emboldened. Then, when a more conservative government came to power, there was a tendency to retain higher state shares. 17 This suggests that the appropriate instrument is a quadratic in the date of the plan approval; thus we use both Appdate and its square (Appdate2).
Share is equal to the book value of enterprise net worth at the time of privatization, since the number of shares was the same proportion of net worth in each enterprise. Enterprises with larger values of Share were more likely to have residual state ownership, perhaps because such enterprises were the largest most prestigious enterprises, which had been built as important state investment projects in the communist era.
-19-18. The rhetoric of reform notwithstanding, the privatizers were skeptical about the consequences of outsider ownership in an environment where few entrepreneurs had been yet tested by the market.
19. Were past book values equal to present values each enterprise would have had the same voucher share price during privatization. In fact, the ratio of the highest share price to the lowest was more than 300.
20. The privatization decisions on locally owned enterprises were usually made by local privatization commissions.
Empp is negatively related to state ownership, suggesting that the privatizers were more willing to remove the state completely where insiders would be numerically strong enough to dominate share ownership. 18 Additionally, these variables are appropriate instruments because they are not current determinants of budgetary softness. Appdate was determined by idiosyncratic features of the privatization process, such as the familiarity that specific privatization officials had with particular enterprises. (To speed the privatization process initially, officials worked first with enterprises they knew well.) Share reflects the book values of the planned era, which are very different from present valuations determined in a completely new economic system, with vastly different relative prices, a new set of trading partners, and new institutions.
19 Employment in enterprises has changed dramatically over the reform period, the average enterprise shedding over 40% of its labor force, suggesting that Empp is not a proxy for any current determinant of enterprise size. Lastly, while it is true that the models of Section III are mis-specified if there are selection effects, the results of that section suggest that current employment does not even belong in X i . Table 4 shows the strength of the relation between the instruments and the instrumented variables, listing the R-squareds of regressions of each of the instrumented variables on the set of instruments.
Evidently, this small set of instruments is satisfactory for Ceno, but not for either local variable, Loco and
Regd. The factors that explain central state ownership do not apply at the local level. 20 Therefore, in some of the regressions that follow, regional dummies are added to the set of instruments. Regional dummies are related to Loco and Regd because there are variations in the residual state share across regions. Table 4 again provides the pertinent evidence on the strength of the relationships.
-20-21. The change in the interpretation of Soft, from an ordered categorical variable to a continuous one, necessitates the slight change in the method of calculation of Cen50, Loc50, and Reg50 from that used for the results presented in Table 3 .
One might doubt the validity of regional dummies as instruments, arguing that the prevalence of soft budgets will vary across regions and therefore that regional dummies belong in X i . This doubt is allayed by a variety of evidence. We have argued that regional variation in soft budgets would arise through the effects of the regional-ownership variables, which are included in the pertinent regressions (to the extent suggested by the exercise reported in Table 3 .) Hence, the regional dummies themselves are not candidates for inclusion in X i , given the use of the regional-ownership variables. Moreover, the regional dummies are all insignificant when added to the ordered probit regressions appearing in the last column of Table 3 (although, again, such evidence must be treated with great caution since those regressions are mis-specified if there are selection effects.) Finally, the overidentification tests (see Table 5 ) endorse the decision to use the regional dummies as instruments. Table 5 presents the instrumental variable results together with comparable ordinary least squares estimates. Because the case for the use of the regional dummies as instruments is somewhat weaker than that for the other four instruments and because the robustness of the central ownership effect is the primary concern, we vary the set of instruments used and the variables instrumented across the columns of Table 5. Analogously to Table 3, Table 5 reports the strength of each ownership effect. Cen50, Loc50, and Reg50 measure the increase in ownership that would be required to change a hard budget constraint into one with a 50% degree of softness. These measures show the change in ownership that would change the predicted score on Soft from 0 to 5, a definition analogous to that used in Table 3 . 21 The results in Table 5 are consistent with those previously presented. Central ownership is always significant, while local ownership is significant in only one case. The magnitude of Cen50 is comparable with that in Table 3 . Interestingly, controlling for selection increases the size of the estimated central ownership effect. (Compare the magnitude of the coefficient of Ceno in column 0 to that in all other -21-columns.) We return to this issue in the next sub-section, which presents further estimates of this phenomenon.
When either of the local ownership variables is instrumented without using regional dummies (columns 2, 3, and 4), both are insignificant. When regional dummies are added to the set of instruments (column 5), Loco is not significant but Regd is, a result that could be due to the differing strength of the instruments for the two variables, but which is also consistent with previous observations that Loco is of marginal importance. Certainly, the estimates of Cen50, Loc50, and Reg50 in column 5 underscore the fact that local ownership in one region, Darhan, has an effect similar in magnitude to that of central ownership, but the effect of local ownership elsewhere is much weaker than that of central ownership. (Newey, 1985, p. 245) . Under the null hypothesis of exogeneity of all instruments, the statistic has a P 2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments minus the number of variables presumed to be endogenous in the soft budget regression. The last lines of Table 5 contain the results, which give no reason to doubt the choice of instruments.
IV.2 Testing for Selectivity using Bivariate Probit
The results so far indicate that central ownership dominates the determination of soft budgets. In this sub-section, we make one last attempt to examine the robustness of this conclusion. We focus exclusively on central ownership selection effects, estimating a maximum likelihood model under the assumption that there are no such effects on the local ownership variables. 22 We follow the methodology of Evans and Schwab (1995) .
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To apply this methodology, we convert pertinent variables to binary ones. Thus, Cend equals 1 when
Ceno is positive and zero otherwise. This conversion does not entail much information loss since Ceno has 80% of its observations at zero and a further 12% close to 51. Similarly, Softd equals 1 when Soft is positive and zero otherwise. Again, information loss is muted since 73% of observations on Soft are zero.
To formulate an estimation model, assume that C i * is a latent variable measuring the net benefits to decision-makers of keeping some central ownership in enterprise i. Cend is unity when C i * > 0 and zero otherwise. Then:
where Z i and 0 i are defined as in the previous section. Similarly, a modified form of equation (1) is: The results are presented in Table 6 . They are completely consistent with those of previous sections.
The central ownership variable is highly significant. The regional ownership variable for Darhan is significant, but the local ownership variable is again insignificant. Table 6 adds an important piece of the picture: the error terms in the two equations are highly correlated. This correlation is negative, implying that the omitted variables that cause an enterprise to be -23-24. Calculated at the sample means of the remaining explanatory variables.
selected into the state sector lead to a smaller probability of a soft budget for that enterprise. Although the magnitudes of the estimates of coefficients in Table 6 are not directly comparable with those in previous tables, there is indirect evidence that the estimated size of the central ownership effect is increased when one allows for the correlation of the errors in the two equations. The central ownership variable has a higher order of significance than in previous tables and its coefficient now dwarfs those of the local ownership variables. The presence of central ownership raises the probability of a soft budget by 0.71.
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These results on selection effects probably contradict the priors of most readers. The usual assumption would be that the state will retain ownership in those enterprises that have characteristics that would make state involvement in the future more likely. In that case, controlling for selection amounts to an attempt to make sure that ownership effects on soft budgets are not spurious ones. In Mongolia, the opposite was the case: the omitted variables that cause an enterprise to be selected into the state sector lead to a smaller probability of a soft budget for that enterprise. Controlling for selection increases the estimated size of the ownership effect. If Mongolia is at all representative of other countries, then this suggests that examining selection effects is very important in uncovering the effects of ownership.
There remains the question of what the omitted variable could be. This has to be a matter of conjecture. One possibility arises from the fact that decisions on privatization were made by a different government than decisions on soft budgets. The privatizers might have chosen to retain partial ownership in those enterprises whose management had close links with the privatizing regime. With a change in government, those enterprises would be out of favor and therefore less likely to receive soft budgets.
V. Conclusions
The data examined in this paper present a remarkable picture, both in showing the powerful effects that reforms have had on enterprises and in uncovering clear relationships delineating the determinants of -24-25. The 78% figure comes from adding the estimate of the central ownership effect derived from Table 6 and the baseline figure of 7% of private enterprises having soft budgets. soft budgets. The baseline against which the figures in Table 1 can be compared is late 1990, when most of the surveyed enterprises would have had soft budgets to some degree. Just five and one half years later, fully 73% of enterprise directors do not expect any state aid when their enterprise falls into troubled times.
Given that over seventy years of socialism fostered the expectations of soft budgets, this is an extraordinary turn-around in beliefs.
The econometric results clearly demonstrate that privatization and decentralization were crucial factors in promoting the change in expectations. The estimates in Table 6 combined with the information in Table 1 suggest that 78% of enterprises would have had soft budgets had all enterprises remained under central government ownership. 25 Moreover, it is clear that if there were complete local ownership, expectations of soft budgets would be closer to those in a regime of completely private ownership than those in a regime of complete central ownership. Hence, decentralization of ownership produces large effects on the presence of soft budgets, ones that are similar to those of privatization itself. One locality bucks this pattern, but it is the exception that proves the rule, since that locality received a soft budget from the central government in the year preceding the collection of our data.
The clarity in the depiction of the results of reforms arises partially from the fact that variables other than ownership and decentralization seem unimportant in explaining perceptions of soft budgets. The only alternative hypothesis receiving somewhat consistent support is that of market concentration suggesting that an enterprise might be too big to fail on the national level. This result again reflects the two features that are present in the major results of this paper. Central, rather than local, policy is bound to be much more important to enterprises that are nationally important. Policies promoting decentralization are likely to reduce the number of such enterprises.
-
25-
To what degree can one vest confidence in the overall validity of these conclusions? Certainly, there is a set of assumptions that would formally invalidate each set of results. For example, judgement on which variables are non-significant in Table 3 might be erroneous because of the ownership selection effects clearly identified in Table 6 . Or, the estimates in Table 5 might be questioned because of the decision to ignore the censored and categorical nature of the dependent variable. Or, one might doubt the treatment of local ownership in Table 4 because its instruments are weak. These are possibilities that cannot be rejected a priori, because the information does not exist to test them.
Therefore, a final appraisal of the validity of the conclusions must rest on the reader's assessment of the plausibility of alternative assumptions that might invalidate our reading of the results. Our judgment is that there is such consistency between the results in the alternative estimations that it is highly unlikely that the qualitative pattern of the results would change if extra data were available to investigate the effects of alternative assumptions. The most plausible reason for such consistency is that each of the estimations is an approximation of the underlying reality.
One issue left unaddressed in this paper is whether our variable Soft really measures soft budgets or whether it simply reflects enterprises' erroneous expectations. In a small country such as Mongolia, where there are close links between enterprise and government, where there is open access to higher levels of government, and where information flows freely, it is unlikely that such expectations are simply flights of fancy. Even if they were, erroneous expectations are important to economic events, since it is expectations of soft budgets that lead to the inefficient enterprise decisions that are the worst consequences of soft budgets. Hence, the dependent variable examined in this paper reflects an important element of reality whichever way one resolves the ambiguity that is embodied in the paper's title.
Table 1: Perceptions of Soft Budget Constraints among Mongolian Enterprises
Enterprise officials were asked the following question: Suppose that unfortunate market conditions resulted in a sudden drop in your enterprise's revenues, so that you might have to lay off workers. How likely is it that the government (either national or local) would help your enterprise out, so that it would not be forced by its financial situation to layoff workers? Please indicate your expectation of the likely government reaction by choosing a point on a scale from 0 to 10 -a "0" means that you think that the government would do absolutely nothing to help out and a "10" means that you think that the government would completely make up for the decline in revenues in some way, and a "5" means the government would make up half the decline in revenues. Choose any number between 0 and 10, indicating your expectation concerning the extent to which government would help out. absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses; *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level; Observations 218 absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses *** significant at the 1% level ** significant at the 5% level * significant at the 10% level
